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The University of Chicago Law Review [61:675 interpretations push labor-management relations toward extremes. The Harvstone/Nielsen rule allows management to lie with impunity, while the Western Wirebound rule allows unions to second-guess employer decisions and exact unwarranted concessions. This Comment proposes a third alternative-a "controlled disclosure" rule. Under this rule, management would have to disclose financial information if the Board found substantial evidence that management either lied during bargaining or came to the table unwilling to agree. 8 This intermediate rule favors neither management nor labor, but seeks to ensure that the process is fair. It requires disclosure in precisely those cases in which management is likely to misuse information, but limits the scope of disclosure and the union's use of the information. Furthermore, because the controlled disclosure standard requires a case-by-case approach, it minimizes the risks of both management and labor abuse-risks invited by the per se approaches of Harvstone/Nielsen and Western Wirebound.
I. GOOD FAITH AND THE DUTY TO FURNISH INFORMATION
To determine whether an employer's competitive disadvantage claim is accurate, the union needs access to the employer's financial information. However, the employer's duty to provide this information depends upon whether failing to do so amounts to acting in bad faith. The debate over financial disclosure rules is thus part of the larger debate over good faith generally.
A. The Requirement of Good Faith
In labor-management relations, the Board and the courts define not only the subjects about which the parties must bargain (terms and conditions of employment), but also how they must bargain (in good faith). Although the meaning of good faith "is not readily ascertainable,"' 9 two general statements can be NLRB, 452 US 666, 678-79 (1981) (stating the NLRA was intended to promote the mutually beneficial resolution of conflicts while preserving management autonomy "to the extent essential for the running of a profitable business").
"8 Under this approach, management would have no duty to substantiate even an inability-to-pay claim made in good faith. Both the Harvstone/Nielsen and the Western Wirebound approaches require management to substantiate all inability-to-pay claims regardless of whether the claims were made in good faith. See Teleprompter Corp. v NLRB, 570 F2d 4, 9 n 2 (lst Cir 1977) (citing cases).
19 Charles J. Morris, ed, 1 The Developing Labor Law 553 (ABA, 2d ed 1983).
made. First, good faith "is inconsistent with a predetermined resolve not to budge from an initial position."" Second, good faith "necessarily requires that claims made by either bargainer should be honest claims." 2 ' Good faith in collective bargaining therefore requires that the parties come to the table willing to agree, and that they do not make false claims. However, it does not require that the parties in fact agree, and it does not restrict their ability to posture, change their positions, or be stubborn. The NLRA itself provides that the obligation to bargain collectively "does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession." 22 To find good or bad faith the Board must examine all of the facts and draw the fine lines separating "puffing" and stubbornness from lying and a predisposition not to agree.
Although the plain language of the NLRA suggests a case-bycase inquiry into good faith in every bargaining dispute, such an approach is not always necessary.' Instead, the Board often employs per se rules, holding that certain actions violate the duty of good faith regardless of their actual purpose. For instance, management would act in bad faith if it refused to bargain with the union for one year after certification, even if it believed in good faith that the union no longer enjoyed majority support. The dispute over competitive disadvantage claims is essentially about whether a per se rule-either in favor of or against disclosure-or the case-by-case approach is more appropriate.
B. The Duty to Disclose Relevant Information
Shortly after Congress passed the NLRA in 1935, the Board held, as a corollary to the general duty of good faith, that man-20 Truitt, 351 US at 154 (Frankfurter concurring in part and dissenting in part); NLRB v Insurance Agents ' Int'l Union, 361 US 477, 498 (1960) (stating the duty to bargain collectively requires parties to approach bargaining with "real desire to come into agreement").
21 Truitt, 351 US at 152.
USC § 158(d).
See id. Section 8(d) requires "the employer and the representative of the employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment.. .. " As one commentator has noted, "Congress did not give content to these words, leaving the Board and the courts to fill them with meaning." Clyde W. Summers, Harry H. Wellington, and Alan Hyde, Cases and Materials on Labor Law 712 (Foundation Press, 2d ed 1982) . Although § 6 gives the Board rulemaking authority, it has typically announced rules in individual cases. See American Hospital Ass'n v NLRB, 499 US 606, 609-10 (1991 1994] agement had a duty to provide the union with relevant information." This requirement implies three related propositions. First, management has the right to keep irrelevant information from the union. Second, the union has the right to inspect any and all relevant information in management's possession. And third, management's refusal to supply such information constitutes a failure to bargain in good faith."
The Supreme Court has described relevant information as that which is "needed by the bargaining representative for the proper performance of its duties." 27 However, the union can generally show "necessity" under a lenient standard similar to that afforded civil litigants in discovery. In NLRB v Acme Industrial Co., the Court held that the Board properly ordered disclosure of information "acting upon the probability that the desired information was relevant, and that it would be of use to the union in carrying out its statutory duties and responsibilities."' Under this standard, the union is entitled to information that would be useful in developing its bargaining positions, and in evaluating management's positions, even if the information is not strictly necessary for bargaining to go forward. 29 As with good-faith inquiries generally, the Board here employs per se rules, holding that certain information is so essential that its relevance need not be reestablished in each case. Information about wages paid to individual employees is a relatively straightforward example." The union is entitled to such information on demand without showing why it would be necessary.
See Pioneer Pearl Button Co., 1 NLRB 837, 842-43 (1936) . See also NLRB v Acme Industrial Co., 385 US 432, 435-36 (1967) 28 Id at 437 (describing this as a "discovery-type standard"). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1) provides: Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action .... The information need not be admissible at trial if the information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. FRCP 26(b)(1) (emphasis added).
"0 See Whitin Machine Works, 108 NLRB 1537 , 1538 -39 (1954 ), enfd, 217 F2d 593 (4th Cir 1954 . See also NLRB v F.W. Woolworth Co., 352 US 938 (1956) (per curiam) (Under the circumstances in this case, "failure to furnish the wage information constituted an unfair labor practice."). Another example is the number of hours each employee in the bargaining unit has worked. Morris, The Developing Labor Law at 624-25 (cited in note 19) ("Items of information related to hours, and other terms and conditions of employment' have been ordered disclosed on the same basis as wage information.").
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For other types of information, the union must show necessity in a particular context. For example, the union is entitled to information about time-study data when the piece rate for certain jobs is at issue, but not as a matter of course."' If management does not voluntarily comply with a union's request for relevant information, the Board can require disclosure." By asserting countervailing interests such as confidentiality, employers sometimes successfully avoid disclosure-even when the union has a legitmate interest in the information. 3 3 However, the union's right to relevant information often outweighs such employer concerns. "Financial information" has historically received greater protection from disclosure than have other types of information. 35 Accordingly, it has only been considered relevant in limited circumstances. Courts have not applied the usefulness standard used in other information-disclosure cases when reviewing union demands for financial information. 3 6 In fact, until Truitt, the circuit courts had split on whether an employer ever had a duty to disclose such information, despite its obvious usefulness to the union." In Truitt, the Court held that an employer could be required to disclose financial information to back up an inability-to-pay claim. 3 " See J. I. Case Co. v NLRB, 253 F2d 149, 154-55 (7th Cir 1958 See note 4 for the definition of financial information. See Teleprompter, 570 F2d at 11 (holding that the "discovery" rule is not tailored to inability-to-pay cases and that the union is entitled only to that information reasonably necessary to substantiate the employer's claim).
" Compare NLRB v Truitt Manufacturing Co., 224 F2d 869, 874 (4th Cir 1955) (no duty to disclose financial information), rev 'd, 351 US 149 (1956 ), with NLRB v Jacobs Manufacturing Co., 196 F2d 680, 684 (2d Cir 1952 (financial information must be disclosed to substantiate certain employer claims).
351 US at 152-53. However, the Court did not apply a per se rule to inability-topay claims. See text accompanying note 55.
The dispute over competitive disadvantage claims persists because the scope of the so-called Truitt duty remains unclear. The Court has neither specified which types of claims must be substantiated nor identified particular circumstances in which substantiation is required. However, courts generally agree that financial information becomes relevant only when employers base certain claims on such information. 3 9 That the information may be useful for developing union negotiation positions in a general sense does not make it relevant. Instead, financial information is relevant only if it enables the union to verify the employer's claim. 40 To set a standard for when employers must back up competitive disadvantage claims, courts must not only resolve the scope of employers' Truitt duties, but must also determine whether these duties conflict with those the Supreme Court articulated in First National Maintenance Corp. v NLRB. 4 The First National Maintenance Court held that "management decisions" are generally not mandatory subjects for bargaining. 42 Recently, the Seventh Circuit cited First National Maintenance to support the Harvstone/Nielsen rule that competitive disadvantage claims need not be substantiated. 4 " Other courts-ignoring the possible importance of First National Maintenance-have held that Truitt does extend to competitive disadvantage claims."
A. NLRB v Truitt
In Truitt, the Supreme Court upheld the Board's determination that an employer's failure to disclose financial information supporting its inability-to-pay claim constituted a failure to bar- gain in good faith. 4 5 During bargaining, the union asked for a wage increase of 10 cents per hour, and the employer countered that anything above 2.5 cents per hour would put it out of business.' The union asked for some evidence to back up the company's claim. When the employer refused this request, the union asked for "full and complete information with respect to [the company's] financial standing and profits." 47 The company refused to provide any substantiating information, telling the union, "the information... is not pertinent to this discussion and the company declines to give you such information; you have no legal right to such."' The Board found that the employer's failure to back up its claim was an unfair labor practice under § 8(a)(5) and ordered the employer to supply the requested information to the union. 4 9 The Fourth Circuit denied enforcement of the Board's order, holding that "[tihe information... relates to matters altogether in the province of management, which were not the proper subject of bargaining."" In the Board's appeal to the Supreme Court, the employer in Truitt argued first that "the information requested was irrelevant to the bargaining process," and second that the information "related to matters exclusively within the province of management." 5 ' The Court disagreed. In enforcing the Board's order it stated:
Good-faith bargaining necessarily requires that claims made by either bargainer should be honest claims. This is true about an asserted inability to pay an increase in wages. If such an argument is important enough to present in the give and take of bargaining, it is important enough to require some sort of proof of its accuracy. 5 2
The Court noted that the Board's policy of requiring substantiation in similar cases had started as early as one year after the We do not hold, however, that in every case in which economic inability is raised as an argument against increased wages it automatically follows that the employees are entitled to substantiating evidence. Each case must turn upon its particular facts. The inquiry must always be whether or not under the circumstances of the particular case the statutory obligation to bargain in good faith has been met. 55 The Court did not remand the case to the Board because, the Court found, the Board had not actually employed a per se rule that all inability-to-pay claims be supported. Instead the Board had reached its conclusion that the employer failed to bargain in good faith "under the facts and circumstances of this case." 56 Justice Frankfurter and two others concurred in the decision to reverse the Fourth Circuit, but dissented on the ground that by failing to remand, the Court had in effect endorsed a per se rule for inability-to-pay claims." Despite the Court's explicit denial and Frankfurter's protest, courts endorsing both the Harvstone/Nielsen and Western Wirebound doctrines have in fact held that Truitt did endorse such a per se rule, at least for inability-to-pay claims. 58 The Court thus rejected the employer's claim that financial information is irrelevant to bargaining. It is less clear, however, Id at 153, citing Pioneer Pearl Button Co., 1 NLRB 837, 842-43 (1936 "' Id at 154-55 (Frankfurter concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that a requirement of disclosure any time an employer refused to substantiate a claim of inability to pay would "make a rule of law out of one item-even if a weighty item-of the evidence"). [61:675
Competitive Disadvantage Claims whether the Court disputed the Fourth Circuit's assertion that some information is "exclusively within the province of management." 9 The Court did not distinguish between information that is itself within the exclusive province of management and information that relates to matters that are within such a province. However, it is quite reasonable to assume that information could relate to matters within the exclusive province, but not be shielded from disclosure if management used it to make false claims. In any case, if there is such a province, after Truitt it does not extend to the information necessary to verify potentially false inability-to-pay claims.
B. First National Maintenance Co. v NLRB
First National Maintenance involved a more basic question:
whether an employer has any duty to bargain at all over certain decisions. The Court held that the Board had exceeded its authority by interpreting "terms and conditions of employment"--about which management must bargain-to include management's decision to close part of a business. 0 First National Maintenance, a cleaning services company, decided not to renew a service contract with one of its customers after the customer insisted on a lower price. 6 ' Although the employer claimed it was closing that part of its business "purely [as] a matter of money," complications arose because the employees terminated as a result of the cancellation had recently voted to unionize. 2 The union requested that the employer bargain about its decision not to renew the contract, and when the employer refused, the union filed an unfair labor practice charge. ' The Board held that even if the employer had based its decision on purely financial considerations, it still had a duty to bargain about the decision itself.' The Second Circuit affirmed but Truitt, 351 US at 151. 60 452 US 666 (1980) . 61 Id at 669-70.
6
Id. The NLRA prohibits employers from closing a part of a business because employees have unionized. Textile Workers Union v Darlington Manufacturing Co., 380 US 263, 274-75 (1965) . Even though a union is not entitled to bargain about a decision to partially close a facility, the Board can require the employer to reinstate the affected employees if the employer's decision was made with anti-union animus. First National Maintenance, 452 US at 682. See also 29 USC § 160(c).
63 452 US at 669-70.
First National Maintenance Corp., 242 NLRB 462, 465 (1979) . The Board endorsed the Administrative Law Judge's determination that an employer with a unionized work force who wishes to alter its hiring arrangements must discuss the decision with the stated that the Board's per se rule was inappropriate. 6 5 Instead, it held that the NLRA creates a rebuttable presumption in favor of mandatory bargaining."
The Supreme Court reversed and announced its own test in the process. The Court stated that "[m]anagement must be free from the constraints of the bargaining process to the extent essential for the running of a profitable business." 7 Because of these concerns about management autonomy, the Court held that management decisions were presumptively not mandatory bargaining subjects. Instead, it held that bargaining "over management decisions that have a substantial impact on the continued availability of employment should be required only if the benefit, for labor-management relations and the collective bargaining process, outweighs the burden placed on the conduct of the business."' The Court premised this balancing test on the rationale that subjects should be mandatory, rather than permissive, only if mandatory bargaining fostered the neutral resolution of confficts. Applying its test, the Court found that requiring management to bargain about "decision[s] ... akin to the decision whether to be in business at all" imposed a substantial burden.° On the other hand, the potential benefit to the union was slight. The Court stated that "[t]he union's practical purpose in participating [ I will be largely uniform: it will seek to delay or halt the closing." 7 The Court thought that it was "unlikely... that requiring bargaining over the decision itself, as well as its effects, will augment th[e] flow of information or suggestions" to management; such a requirement would therefore not "foster in a neutral manner a system in which the conflict between [labor and management] may be resolved." 72 union, whether the reason is "lack of money or a mere desire to become richer." Id at 465. ' NLRB v First National Maintenance Corp., 627 F2d 596, 601-02 (1980) . [61:675
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The Court distinguished its ruling in First National Maintenance from Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v NLRB, in which it had required management to bargain about its decision to subcontract work previously done by unionized employees." 3 In that case, "a desire to reduce labor costs.., was at the base of the employer's decision to subcontract." 74 The Fibreboard Court found this desire "peculiarly suitable for resolution within the collective bargaining framework,"' noting that the decision "did not alter the [c]ompany's basic operation." 76 Such bargaining, the Fibreboard Court had concluded, "would not significantly abridge [the employer's] freedom to manage the business." 77 The First National Maintenance Court explicitly limited its decision: "In this opinion we of course intimate no view as to other types of management decisions, such as plant relocations, sales, other kinds of subcontracting, automation, etc., which are to be considered on their particular facts."' The Court neither discussed nor even cited Truitt, although both opinions address the NLRA's limits on management autonomy and seem to reach divergent conclusions. Truitt requires an employer to disclose financial information when asserting inability to pay, while First National Maintenance excuses the employer from even having to bargain over certain management decisions, let alone having to disclose information."
The tension between First National Maintenance and Truitt becomes quite evident when one considers that an inability to pay arguably represents the most essential of management decisions. Indeed, the First National Maintenance Court's holding that management must be "free from the constraints of the bargaining process to the extent essential for the running of a profitable business"' bears a striking resemblance to the Fourth 73 379 US 203 (1964 
A. Western Wirebound: The Broad Disclosure Standard
In NLRB v Western Wirebound Box Co., the Ninth Circuit applied Truitt beyond inability-to-pay claims by enforcing a Board order requiring an employer to back up its competitive disadvantage claim. 2 The Western Wirebound doctrine embodies the principle that in order to ensure fair collective bargaining, the union must be able to evaluate management's claims." As one commentator has argued, "the nature of the employer's claim is irrelevant; the important principle is that an employer must prove what it claims."" The Western Wirebound court reasoned that in both inability-to-pay and competitive disadvantage cases, "the give-and-take of collective bargaining is hampered and ren- dered ineffectual when an employer mechanically repeats his claim but makes no effort to produce substantiating data."" 5 Proponents of Western Wirebound argue that Truitt's language sweeps far more broadly than the substantiation of the inability-to-pay claim at issue there. For example, the Truitt Court reasoned that if an argument "is important enough to present in the give and take of bargaining, it is important enough to require some sort of proof of its accuracy" and noted that "[glood-faith bargaining necessarily requires that claims made by either bargainer should be honest claims." 6 Further, the Court stated that "[t]he ability of an employer to increase wages without injury to his business is a commonly considered factor in wage negotiations." 8 7 This argument also implies that unverified claims of both competitive disadvantage and inability to pay similarly undermine the bargaining process." Thus, although the Truitt Court focused primarily on the employer's conduct, Western Wirebound proponents argue that it was concerned not with such conduct in the abstract, but rather with the effect such conduct had on the union's ability to bargain. Under this instrumentalist interpretation, the problem with dishonest claims is that they hamper the bargaining process by preventing the union from fully participating." In short, Western Wirebound uses Truitt to fashion a per se rule that enables the union to make headway in bargaining, not one that simply punishes dishonest employers.
If the Truitt Court was primarily concerned with the effect of unsubstantiated claims on the union's ability to bargain, it also follows that the union should be able to trigger disclosure.
[T]he give-and-take of bargaining. makes a particular claim in good faith. This is essentially a presumption that failing to back up claims amounts to bad faith.
B. Western Wirebound: Carrying Truitt Too Far
Proponents defend Western Wirebound's per se rule of bad faith on several grounds. First, the rule avoids cumbersome caseby-case inquiries that require the Board and the reviewing court to sift through long records, possibly delaying bargaining for years."' Second, even if such inquiries could be accomplished expeditiously, they involve ascertaining the parties' states of mind-a process that proponents assert inevitably devolves into a search for objective criteria to evaluate the parties' conduct during bargaining." Reliance on such criteria, they claim, creates the "incongruous result of the NLRB and the courts regulating the manner in which collective bargaining is conducted regardless of the actor's actual state of mind." 9 3 Because the Western Wirebound view focuses on the effect of unsubstantiated claims on the bargaining process, an inquiry into good faith would be unnecessary.
However, all of these arguments ignore the direct conflict between the Western Wirebound doctrine and the reasoning of Truitt itself. The Truitt Court specifically stated that it was not even requiring substantiation of all inability-to-pay claims, 94 yet proponents of the Western Wirebound doctrine distort Truitt to provide support for their per se rule requiring substantiation of all competitive disadvantage claims. 95 It is true that lower courts and the Board have uniformly held that Truitt created a per se rule, rather than a presumption, for inability-to-pay claims, 9 6 and that the Supreme Court has not overruled any of these seemingly blatant misreadings of Truitt. But neither the fact that many courts have misread Truitt nor the Court's acquiescence in this regard provides a convincing basis for extending these misreadings of Truitt to competitive disadvantage claims.
One commentator has argued that Truitt may actually have required a case-by-case analysis, but claims that finding bad faith based on the failure to back up claims makes sense as a modern rule. 9 7 If the effect on the union is the same no matter what the employer intends, so the argument runs, an inquiry into the employer's state of mind would be pointless. 8 Whether the employer is honest or trying to stall negotiations makes no difference to the union. The effect on the union and the bargaining process is the same regardless of the truth of the claims. 99 Although this may be true, the argument assumes the bargaining process as a whole would change for the better. The Western Wirebound doctrine fails to acknowledge the risk that unions will misuse financial information. 0 0 Such a concern is consistent with the First National Maintenance Court's protection of management autonomy.
C. Harvstone/Nielsen: The Narrow Disclosure Standard
In a series of cases beginning in 1966, the Seventh Circuit has interpreted Truitt as requiring that employers need back up only their inability-to-pay claims. ' Under this view, the Harvstone/Nielsen doctrine, unless an employer claims inability to pay, it is simply claiming that it does not want to pay, a claim it need not verify. 1 " 2 The Harvstone/Nielsen decisions provide three arguments for reading Truitt narrowly. First, the Supreme Court in Truitt intended only to prevent impermissible threats of bankruptcy, a concern limited to inability-to-pay claims. 0° 
Truitt and impermissible threats.
The Nielsen II court distinguished competitive disadvantage claims from the inability-to-pay claims at issue in Truitt based on the meaning of the claims themselves. The court noted that if the union cannot demand substantiation of inability-to-pay claims, "the employer would have an unfair advantage in bargaining, because it would be making an express or implied threat (of bankruptcy) that the union could not evaluate." 0 6 According to the Seventh Circuit, the Truitt Court was concerned that if such threats could occur, labor negotiations would involve an even greater element of bluff, guesswork, and sheer gambling than they inevitably do, because the union would be put to the Hobson's choice of acceding to a quite possibly exaggerated claim of poverty or risking its members' jobs. The [Truitt] Court didn't think that forcing the union to play Russian roulette was the epitome of good faith bargaining. 0 7 This interpretation of Truitt presumes that the major decision unions need to make is whether to strike or to accede to the employer's demands." 8 To make this decision, the court reasoned that the union only needs prior assurance that the strike will not be futile.' If the employer can afford higher wages than it claims, however, it would also be more likely to survive a strike and be able permanently to replace union workers."° Under this argument, an inability-to-pay claim is improper because the union is forced to decide without complete information. The threat thus improperly limits the union's ability to exercise its right to strike."' In contrast, competitive disadvantage claims create no such problem. Once the employer states that it can pay, the union has According to the HarvstonelNielsen doctrine, employers who make competitive disadvantage claims without substantiation are simply being stubborn." 6 Since § 8(d) of the NLRA protects the right of the parties to disagree, making such a claim without substantiation is not an unfair labor practice."' Moreover, as the court stated in Nielsen I, requiring the employer to back up "a "want" is pointless: "A need is objective; it can be substantiated. But how do you substantiate a want? If a company says it wants to make higher profits by reducing its labor costs, what data would falsify its statement?"" 8 3. Competitive disadvantage claims as management "decisions."
Even if competitive disadvantage claims represent more than disagreement, and even if they are in fact threats similar to inability-to-pay claims, a broad interpretation of First National Maintenance would still excuse management from any obligation to back up such claims. 11 9 The distinction between mandatory and permissive bargaining subjects entitles the employer to make certain statements, including (it is argued) competitive disadvantage claims, with impunity. 20 Because a competitive disadvantage claim concerns a decision about the future of the enterprise, which is generally not a mandatory subject of bargaining, the fact that the employer ties its claim to a negotiating position on wages will not trigger a duty to back up the claim.' 2 ' In Nielsen II, the court explained, " [t] he company claimed that to stem the hemorrhage of its business it had to cut the compensation of its hourly workers. Well, was that true?" 22 The court left this question unanswered, implying that the union had neither a need for nor a right to substantiation. That is, even if the claim were false, the employer would have no duty to back it up. Rather, the union's "right" to substantiation extended only so far as it could force disclosure by use of its power to strike. 2 To receive First National Maintenance's protection of management autonomy, competitive disadvantage claims must be decisions about which management need not bargain. When an employer claims that it can afford to pay the wages demanded, the argument goes, it is not "in any financial trouble" and is not threatening bankruptcy; it is merely announcing a decision about the scale of operations. 2 4 Thus, an employer making a competitive disadvantage claim could only bargain about "whether to shrink its operations." 2 5 In Nielsen II, the court rejected the notion that the union should have a say in the decision whether to shrink operations, explaining that "[clodetermination is not the theory of the [NLRA] 12 Judge Posner, author of the Nielsen decisions, agrees that the NLRA prohibits parties from making false claims. However, not every possibility of a false claim requires the same safeguards. The risk that an inability-to-pay claim is false is substantial enough to impose a duty on the employer to disclose. The risk that a competitive disadvantage claim is false is much lower, and an employer therefore should not be required to substantiate. Conversation with Judge Richard A. Posner (memo on file with U Chi L Rev).
124 Nielsen II, 977 F2d at 1170. This argument relies on the premise that "financial trouble" does not include situations in which an employer "continue[s] losing business" but is still "profitable at one percent of current output." See id.
union has the right to have answered is whether the employer can in fact afford to pay the wage the union has requested. 7 Once management acknowledges that it can afford the wage, 2 the union has all the information it needs (or is entitled to). 29
D. Harvstone/Nielsen: Applying False Analogies
None of the rationales supporting the Harvstone/Nielsen doctrine holds up under close examination. Further, while this Comment agrees that First National Maintenance should inform the proper disclosure standard for competitive disadvantage claims, the Seventh Circuit's derivation of the Harvstone/Nielsen doctrine misapplies the rule from that case.
1. Threats, needs, and wants.
According to the Seventh Circuit, Truitt protects unions against impermissible "threats," and competitive disadvantage claims are not threatening. Thus, a union facing such a claim has all the information it needs in order to know whether to strike. Because it knows the employer can, in some sense, afford to pay the requested wage, a strike might not be futile. 3 '
The union does not, however, have all the information it needs to make an informed decision; it has only the information it is apparently entitled to receive. For example, if an employer claims that it must cut wages in order to "stem the hemorrhage of its business,"'' the union may have no idea whether the statement is true or false. Claims that link an employer's demands to the financial health of the company threaten the union precisely because they raise the risk there will be no company at all if the union does not accede to the employer's demands. Further, an employer making the "hemorrhage" claim cannot in any "2 Id at 1171. 128 It is unclear whether the employer must explicitly acknowledge its ability to pay.
In Nielsen II, the court noted that "[ilf [ an employer] disclaims poverty, it moots any request for information that would be relevant only if poverty were being claimed." 977 F2d at 1171 (emphasis added). In Harvstone, however, the court noted that the employers "never implied that they were financially unable, as opposed to unwilling, to meet the Union's demands." 785 F2d at 576. A competitive disadvantage claim might therefore contain an implicit disclaimer of poverty.
' Nielsen II, 977 F2d at 1171. To illustrate how the company moots a demand for information by conceding that it can pay the requested wages, the court analogized the union to a civil litigant in discovery who receives a stipulation instead of documents. Id.
w See text accompanying notes 106-113. ... Nielsen II, 977 F2d at 1170. meaningful way be simultaneously claiming it is not "in any financial trouble."" 2 Both statements cannot be true. 3 ' If the employer can make the union believe it is in financial trouble, its competitive disadvantage claim would be only slightly less threatening than an inability-to-pay claim. Additionally, courts applying the HarvstonelNielsen doctrine assert that competitive disadvantage claims are simply manifestations of an employer's disagreement with the union's position. Yet competitive disadvantage claims are typically stated as needs rather than wants. For example, a court found a competitive disadvantage claim where the employer said that "concessions were needed in order to 'be competitive' and 'survive in today's market." 3 4
Just as with inability-to-pay claims, when an employer claims competitive disadvantage it asserts that it "cannot" pay the requested wage without dire consequences. The urgency of the need falls off when an employer claims that while it can pay now, it will lose business and lay off workers. This does not, however, transform a need into a want. In contrast, when an employer says that it would like to make more money or that it wants to be more competitive, it does not link its position to a prediction about the future of the enterprise. While such claims may represent serious bargaining positions, they are more likely to be interpreted as "puffing" than as a threat.
There is a crucial difference between an employer's assertion that the union's demands are unreasonable and the assertion that accepting the demands would be economically irrational. When an employer states that it needs a concession in order to survive, either immediately or in the long-term, it intends its statement to be acted upon, and such statements should be made in good faith.
Moreover, contrary to the Seventh Circuit's implication, 1 3 the NLRA may forbid persistent claims by management that it does not want to pay. While the NLRA does not require the parties to agree, it nonetheless prohibits the parties from coming to the To the extent management's unsupported claim manifests such an intent, it is irrelevant whether the claim concerns a mandatory or non-mandatory subject.' 3 7 Repeated, but unsubstantiated, competitive disadvantage claims could be strong evidence of such predisposition.
2. Misinterpreting the scope of First National Maintenance.
The Seventh Circuit's application of First National Maintenance to competitive disadvantage claims improperly disregards that case's balancing test, assumes that such claims are actually "management decisions," and contradicts Truitt. a) Neglecting the First National Maintenance balancing test. The Harvstone/Nielsen doctrine incorporates a misinterpretation of First National Maintenance. The Seventh Circuit assumes that all decisions about the scale of operations lie outside the realm of mandatory subjects of bargaining."' Yet in determining whether specific management decisions are mandatory or permissive bargaining subjects, First National Maintenance requires the Board and the reviewing court to determine whether the "benefit, for labor-management relations and the collectivebargaining process, outweighs the burden placed on the conduct of the business."" 9 When it decided that partial closings were not mandatory subjects of bargaining, the First National Maintenance Court noted that "labor costs may not be a crucial circumstance in a particular economically based partial termination."' 4 At the same time, it distinguished Fibreboard, which held the decision to subcontract work to be a mandatory subject,' noting that "a desire to reduce labor costs" was especial- " Employers need not bargain about non-mandatory subjects. However, an employer that consistently responded to union wage proposals by stating, "I don't want to pay that," without ever offering an alternative or stating a reason could be held to have failed to bargain in good faith.
Compare First National Maintenance, 452 US at 686 & n 22 (weighing the harms and benefits caused by giving the union a voice in particular management decisions), with Nielsen II, 977 F2d at 1170-71 (arguing that the union categorically has no say in the scale of the employer's operations).
1 First National Maintenance, 452 US at 679. 14 Id at 685.
.. Fibreboard, 379 US at 213.
ly "suitable for resolution within the collective bargaining framework." 42 In a recent plant relocation case that raises issues under both First National Maintenance and Truitt, the Second Circuit held that an employer must not only bargain about its decision to transfer business from Connecticut to Georgia, Texas, and Mexico, but must also provide the union with information to back up its claim that it needed to make the transfer because of labor costs.
Applying the First National Maintenance balancing test, the Second Circuit first noted that under Fibreboard, an employer must bargain about an economically motivated action that results in no change in basic business operations.' Finding that the employer's decision was "motivated by a desire to reduce labor costs," and that such decisions are "particularly suited to resolution through the collective bargaining process," the court concluded that "the Company's course of conduct would not have been unduly hampered by bargaining."
45
When an employer has decided to scale back rather than close part of its operations, and where labor costs dominate the resolution of this issue, the First National Maintenance benefitburden test suggests that such management decisions are usually not insulated from bargaining. If wages are the basis for the company's decision to lay off workers and scale back operations, then, the Harvstone/Nielsen doctrine notwithstanding, Fibreboard and First National Maintenance seem to command that the union does indeed have a say in the decision.
b) Claims are not decisions. Assuming First National
Maintenance applies to decisions about the scale of operations as well as to partial closings, it applies only to decisions. To invoke First National Maintenance, management should first have to claim it has made or is about to make a decision about which it need not bargain. Yet management cannot unilaterally decide to reduce wages without first bargaining to an impasse, 14 6 even if it might be able to unilaterally close 50 percent of its business and lay off half of its workers. At most, competitive disadvantage claims represent predictions about future business conditions, given certain assumptions about wages and other factors. Thus, an employer that makes a competitive disadvantage claim when it has not yet made any decision cannot appropriately claim the protection of First National Maintenance. c) Implicitly overruling Truitt. Finally, if a competitive disadvantage claim in fact represents a management decision, an inability-to-pay claim presents an even stronger case for protection from substantiation because it implicates the "decision whether to be in business at all."' 4 7 In Nielsen II, the court reasoned that competitive disadvantage claims are about a company's scale of operations, " 8 but the same is true of inability-to-pay claims. In each case the employer links its financial condition to the wages it pays.
If First National Maintenance holds that management need never substantiate claims that link a potential decision to scale back operations with the level of wages, then inability-to-pay (as well as competitive disadvantage) claims must be insulated as well, a conclusion that would contradict Truitt. Nothing in First National Maintenance suggests that the Court intended to overrule Truitt, and no subsequent decision has so construed First National Maintenance. Before inquiring into good faith in a particular context, the Board should determine whether the claim was relevant to bargaining. A relevant claim would be one on which the parties would reasonably rely during negotiations. Irrelevant claims induce no reliance, and thus need not be supported. In determining whether a claim was relevant, the Board must inquire into how management intended the claim to be taken, and how the union might rationally have interpreted it. The Board should determine whether management intended the union to act on its claim, and whether a reasonable union would have based its actions on the accuracy of the claim.
IV. CONTROLLED DISCLOSURE

Predisposition and honesty.
Once the Board finds that the claim is relevant, it should determine whether the claim was made in good faith. 4 9 To determine if the employer came to the negotiations with a predisposition not to agree, the Board should consider whether the claim was repeated mechanically, without any offer of substantiating evidence. To determine if the employer's refusal to substantiate the claim suggests untruth, the Board should consider: (1) whether the employer has an economic interest in supporting the claim; (2) whether substantiation of the claim might force bargaining about .non-mandatory subjects such as decisions about the future of the business; and (3) whether the information might be used to embarrass the employer or to delay negotiations.
These "truthfulness questions" draw their power from the economic forces acting on the employer. First, since an employer wants to pay wages as low as possible, it has an incentive to seek concessions from the union. The union likewise has an incentive to push for wages as high as possible. An employer might honestly believe, for example, that current wages are too high or that the union's requested increase would be too large. Such conces-sions are more likely if the employer supports its claim. Thus, an employer's failure to back up a claim when substantiation would be in its best economic interest provides probative, but not dispositive, evidence of untruthfulness.
Second, an employer might legitimately refuse to back up an accurate claim when it reasonably fears that the union would misuse the information. For example, in Sign and Pictorial Union Local 1175 v NLRB, the union alleged that strike replacements were receiving higher wages than strikers and requested wage information, which would have included the names of replacements. 5° Fearing that the replacements would be harassed, the employer refused to provide the information, and the court upheld the Board's decision.' 5 ' On the other hand, if the union is unlikely to misuse the information, there is less reason to withhold it-and therefore some reason to suspect the veracity of the claim.
If the Board determines that the claim is untrue or a possible stalling tactic, it may require substantiation. In making its determination, the Board should review an employer's financial information in camera before requiring disclosure. This is not a burdensome requirement, and it will facilitate the resolution of the parties' dispute through informal discussions. Indeed, the vast majority of labor disputes are settled by means of informal discussions among representatives of the Board, the employer, and the union." 2 Under the controlled disclosure approach, then, financial information lies in the exclusive province of management-unless management uses the information improperly. Thus, if management uses the information as leverage for a false claim, the Board may order disclosure. This approach is consistent with the general rule that the scope of the duty to disclose financial information is limited to verifying claims.' 30, 1990 6-7 (US GPO, 1992 . In fiscal year 1990, approximately 86 percent of all meritorious cases were settled through formal or informal agreements at the regional level, and another 7 percent were disposed by compliance with an administrative law judge's decision. The final 7 percent were contested before the Board.
10 See text accompanying notes 39-40.
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B. Reconciling Truitt and First National Maintenance
The controlled disclosure approach reconciles the potential conflict between First National Maintenance and Truitt. Truitt held that an employer's obligation to disclose financial information must turn on the "particular facts" of each case.' This language suggests that the Court rejected both the broad and the narrow per se rules for financial information disclosures, even if it did not spell out clearly how the Board should determine good faith in such cases.
The controlled disclosure approach thus reads Truitt to require that claims beyond inability-to-pay be supported. However, by requiring a case-by-case determination of good faith, the Court did not impose on employers the duty to back up every claim. Why did the Court limit the employer's duty to claims made in bad faith, given that it could have predicted that the effect of an unsupported claim on the union would likely be the same regardless of whether the claim was true or not? It is possible that the Truitt Court feared that management might abuse its right to withhold information and the union might abuse the information once it was disclosed.
Under this reading, Truitt is a compromise. Rather than endorsing either a broad or narrow rule, Truitt suggests an expectation that conditions will vary, sometimes allowing employers to make claims without substantiation, other times requiring substantiation in order to keep bargaining open. The Court focused on the bargaining process in general, rather than simply on the effect of a particular rule on the union's ability to make progress in negotiations. Further, the general requirement of good faith does not allow dishonest claims in the bargaining process. This interpretation implies that the Court wanted the Board to make the determination of whether a claim need be substantiated, rather than allowing the union to force-or the employer to block-disclosure.' 5 5
The controlled disclosure approach also reconciles First National Maintenance with Truitt. The First National Maintenance Court reasoned that "[mianagement must be free from the constraints of the bargaining process to the extent essential for the running of a profitable business."' 56 The risk that the union will misuse information extends beyond simple harassment and delay. The union might second-guess the employer's bargaining position or press for even higher wages after receiving substantiating financial data.' 57 Forcing an inquiry into the employer's good faith before requiring disclosure places the Board under an affirmative obligation to assess the risk of union second-guessing and harassment. Even where an employer's claim was made in bad faith, the Board would be required to tailor its disclosure order to account for the risk of union misuse.' 58 By requiring case-by-base inquiries, the controlled disclosure approach protects employers and unions from each other's misuse of financial information. If an employer makes a claim in bad faith, it must substantiate. However, the union can only use the information to verify the claim-it may not, for example, base a strike decision on the information. If the union decided to receive the substantiating information, it could still strike later, but would have to prove it did not base the strike on the disclosed information. It is unlikely the union would risk this burden.
Consider a case where an employer claims that it needs a wage concession of $1.75 an hour in order to remain competitive and the union asks for substantiating information. The employer voluntarily discloses a financial analysis substantiating its position, which shows a range of possible concession from $1.00 to $2.50. With the threat of a strike, the union might exploit the analysis by insisting on a concession of $1.25. Since the union is only entitled to the information for the purposes of substantiating the employer's claim, and not to enable it to bargain more effectively, this use would be prohibited. In determining whether the union had misused the information, the Board would look at statements union representatives made to rank-and-file workers.
This notion is controversial. This Comment argues that some restraint on the union's use of the information is necessary to ensure consistency with First National Maintenance. However, 18 First National Maintenance, 452 US at 678-79. 157 The information a union requests may itself be evidence of an intent to harass the employer or otherwise interfere with the bargaining process. For example, in Nielsen II the court noted that the union asked for information on management perquisites-something outside the scope of mandatory bargaining. 977 F2d at 1169.
" The union's use of the information beyond simply substantiating management's claim might even be seen as a punishment of the employer. The Board has no authority to penalize an employer; it can only order remedies that will make the workers whole. See NLRB v Strong, 393 US 357, 359 (1969).
the Court has not addressed whether it would be an unfair labor practice for the union to use financial information to obtain a more favorable bargaining position on a mandatory subject. In NLRB v Jacobs Manufacturing Co., a case cited in Truitt, the Second Circuit noted that the union would not be entitled to information that would allow it to second-guess management's decisions." 9 This Comment argues that the Jacobs court's reasoning should be extended to cover the union's use of financial information after disclosure.
0
The controlled disclosure rule thus balances the risks of both union and management abuse. Management should be subject to a rule that does not allow it to harass or delay, and the union should face a rule that will limit the permissible uses it can make of the information it receives. In this way, both parties internalize the cost of their own abuses-and thus face incentives to minimize such behavior.
The controlled disclosure approach may be more complicated to administer, because it requires an inquiry into whether the claim was honest or part of a predisposition not to reach agreement. According to one commentator, the Board and the courts would be spared this "onerous judicial task" if the Western Wirebound standard were adopted.'1 6 This claim is true, however, only if one assumes compliance with the Western Wirebound rule. In fact, a recalcitrant employer would be able to delay disclosure with minimal penalty to itself even under a per se rule of substantiation.' 62 Additionally, while the Board's inquiry under either of the per se rules might be shorter, it must seek enforcement in the courts of appeal, 6 3 and its decision is still subject to review.1 6 Since these latter concerns clearly exist under the controlled disclosure rule as well, the advantage of applying either of the per se rules seems minimal.
'0 196 F2d 680, 684 (2d Cir 1952) (holding the Board could not require an employer to produce proof that its "business decision" was right).
'60 In Truitt, the Court found that the Board's disclosure order was not burdensome, and so declined to rule on the scope of Board orders generally. 351 US at 1510. 161 Note, 87 Mich L Rev at 2051 (cited in note 4). 
